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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals the district court’s order granting suppression of 
evidence.  Specifically, the state challenges the district court’s holding that 
seeing Fuller’s car tires cross over the white line marking the right edge of the 
road did not provide reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Deputy Ballman pulled over a Chevy Tahoe for failure to maintain its lane 
of travel.  (R., pp. 7-8.)  The driver verbally identified herself as Antonia K. Fuller.  
(R., p. 8.)  Fuller did not have a driver’s license or insurance documentation.  (Id.)  
Dispatch indicated her license was invalid.  (Id.)  Deputy Ballman arrested Fuller 
and thereafter conducted an inventory search of her vehicle.  (Id.)  He found 
methamphetamine, pills and drug paraphernalia.  (Id.) 
 The state charged Fuller with two felony counts of possession of 
methamphetamine and possession of Hydrocodone and misdemeanor counts of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, failure to provide proof of insurance and failure 
to purchase a driver’s license.  (R., pp. 54-56.)  Fuller moved to suppress 
evidence, claiming “the traffic stop was unlawful.”  (R., pp. 52-53, 59-63.)  The 
parties stipulated that Fuller “did, in fact, cross the fog line with her tire and that 
she did not have her turn signal on when she did so.”  (3/28/16 Tr., p. 3, L. 10 – 
p. 4, L. 1.)  The district court granted the suppression motion after concluding 
that crossing over the fog line was not a traffic offense, and therefore the officer 
2 
 
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Fuller’s car.  (4/1/16 Tr., p. 3, L. 10 – p. 7, 
L. 22; R., p. 84.)  The state filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 5, 87.1) 
 
 
 
                                            
1 A copy of the notice of appeal was not included in the record provided on 
appeal.  The state is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a 
motion to augment with a copy of the notice. 
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ISSUE 
 
 Did the district court err when it concluded that seeing Fuller’s tires cross 
the white line marking the right edge of the road did not provide reasonable, 
articulable suspicion for the traffic stop? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Seeing Fuller’s Tires Cross The 
White Line Marking The Right Edge Of The Road Did Not Provide Reasonable, 
Articulable Suspicion For The Traffic Stop 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 In concluding that crossing the fog line does not provide reasonable 
suspicion a motorist is not driving in a single lane of travel, the district court relied 
on State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 362 P.3d 514 (2015).  (4/1/16 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 19-
23.)  The district court concluded that “the overall reading of the Neal case” leads 
to the legal conclusion that “the fog line is not a road barrier; the fog line is, in 
fact, a warning that one is getting near the road barrier.”   (4/1/16 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 18-
25.)  The district court then concluded there was no reasonable suspicion 
because Fuller “did not drive off the road” and therefore her “vehicle did not leave 
its lane of travel.”  (4/1/16 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-11.)  The district court’s holding is not 
consistent with the language or analysis of the majority opinion in Neal, and is 
directly contrary to controlling authority of the Idaho Court of Appeals.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. Colvin, 
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Follow The Holding In Neal 
 
“A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).  
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).  However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime.  Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 
203 P.3d at 1210.   
“An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws.”  Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)).  “Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer.”  State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citation omitted).  Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
before the time of the stop.  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).  Here the 
officer observed Fuller drive her vehicle over the line marking the right edge of 
6 
 
the roadway.  (3/28/16 Tr., p. 3, L. 10 – p. 4, L. 1.)  The officer therefore had 
reasonable suspicion Fuller had violated I.C. § 49-630(1) (vehicle to be driven on 
right half of roadway) and I.C. § 49-637 (driver to maintain lane of traffic). 
The district court acknowledged there was “one bit of language” in Neal 
supporting the state’s argument that by driving over, as opposed to on, the line 
Fuller violated I.C. §§ 49-630(1) and 49-637.  (4/1/16 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 8-18.)  That bit 
of language is the holding:  “We hold that driving onto but not across the line 
marking the right edge of the road does not violate Idaho Code section 49-637 
….”  Neal, 159 Idaho at 447, 362 P.3d at 522.  Contrary to the district court’s 
analysis, nothing in the opinion suggests that driving “across the line marking the 
right edge of the road” does not violate I.C. §§ 49-630(1) and 49-637.  Id.  
Because Fuller drove “across the line marking the right edge of the road” she left 
the travelled roadway, went onto the shoulder, and therefore violated I.C. §§ 49-
630(1) and 49-637.  Id.  The district court erred by expanding the holding of Neal 
to crossing the line marking the right edge of the road when the Idaho Supreme 
Court specifically limited that holding to driving on, and not over, that line. 
 Moreover, there is Idaho authority on the question addressed by the 
district court.  In State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 298, 32 P.3d 685, 690 (Ct. App. 
2001), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that “when Officer Burns observed 
Slater’s tires cross the fog line, albeit fleetingly, Burns now possessed the 
requisite reasonable suspicion that Slater had violated I.C. § 49-630 by driving on 
the shoulder of the highway, rather than on the ‘roadway.’”  (citing State v. 
Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 665-67, 991 P.2d 388, 390-92 (Ct. App. 1999)).  This 
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holding was not called into question by the holding or analysis in Neal, and has, 
since Neal was decided, been reaffirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals.  State v. 
Garcia-Rodriguez, 2016 WL 3223372 (Idaho App. 2016), pet. rev. pending. 
 In this case the officer observed Fuller’s vehicle cross “the line marking 
the right edge of the road.”  Neal, 159 Idaho at 447, 362 P.3d at 522.  She was, 
therefore, temporarily out of her lane of travel and off the roadway.  Slater, 
136 Idaho at 298, 32 P.3d at 690.  The officer therefore had reasonable 
suspicion and conducted the traffic stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  
The district court erred by holding otherwise.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s 
order suppressing evidence and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 18th day of August, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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